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Abstract
Previous papers on time-inconsistent procrastination assume projects are completed
once begun. We develop a model in which a person chooses whether and when to
complete each stage of a long-term project. In addition to procrastination in starting
a project, a naive person might undertake costly e¤ort to begin a project but then
never complete it. When the costs of completing di¤erent stages are more unequal,
procrastination is more likely, and it is when later stages are more costly that people
start but don’t …nish projects. Moreover, if the structure of costs over the course of
a project is endogenous, people are prone to choose cost structures that lead them to
start but not …nish projects. We also consider several extensions of the model that
further illustrate how people may incur costs on projects they never complete.
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There is a growing literature in economics that explores the implications of self-control problems,
conceived of as a time-inconsistent taste for immediate grati…cation. Such preferences can give rise
to procrastination.1 Existing research on procrastination assumes that a “project” requires only
a single period of e¤ort, and is completed once begun.2 But most real-world projects, in contrast,
take some duration to complete, involve e¤ort costs that vary for di¤erent stages of the project,
and can be abandoned after begun.
In this paper, we develop and analyze a simple model of long-term projects. In this environment,
a person might not only procrastinate in starting a bene…cial project, she might also start a project
but then procrastinate in …nishing it. We describe how the structure of costs over the course of a
project plays an important role in whether and how a person procrastinates. Moreover, we show
that if the cost structure is endogenous, naive procrastinators are prone to choose precisely the
types of cost structure that make it most likely that they start but do not …nish projects, and
in some environments may incur large repeated costs on never-to-be-completed projects. Hence,
in addition to all the rational reasons people may delay …nishing long-term projects or jettison a
project after putting in considerable e¤ort, our analysis describes how and when ine¢cient delay
and non-completion of projects can arise because of the human tendency to pursue immediate
grati…cation.
In Section 2, we describe a formalization of time-inconsistent preferences originally developed
by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of intergenerational altruism, and later employed by
Laibson (1994,1997) to capture self-control problems within an individual: In addition to time-
consistent discounting, a person always gives extra weight to current well-being over future well-
being. These “present-biased preferences” imply that each period a person tends to pursue imme-
diate grati…cation more than she would have preferred if asked in any prior period. An important
issue arises when a person has such self-control problems: How aware is the person of her future
self-control problems? The results in this paper, as in previous papers, demonstrate the role that
naivete — underestimation of future self-control problems — plays in procrastination. To em-
phasize this role, our analysis compares four types of people: TCs have standard time-consistent
preferences; sophisticates have self-control problems and are fully aware of those problems; naifs
have self-control problems and are fully unaware of those problems, and partial naifs have self-
1 For recent papers discussing procrastination, see, for instance, Prelec (1989), Akerlof (1991),
Fischer (1999), and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b, 2001).
2 A notable exception is Fischer (1999), who studies the behavior of sophisticates who must spend
a… x e da m o u n to ft i m eo nap r o j e c tb e f o r ead e a d l i n e .
1control problems and are aware of those self-control problems, but underestimate their magnitude.
In Section 3, we present our model of long-term projects. We assume for simplicity that a
project has two stages, which we often refer to as “starting” and “…nishing” the project. There
is an in…nite number of periods in which the person can work on the project. In each period the
person can either complete the current stage, in which case she incurs an immediate cost associated
with that stage, or she can do nothing. Completion of the …rst stage does not generate any bene…ts,
but when (and if) the second stage is completed, an in…nite stream of bene…ts begins the following
period.
In Section 3, we take the structure of costs over the course of the project to be exogenous. In
this environment, TCs immediately start and then …nish the project if and only if the project is
worth doing in terms of its net discounted present value. Otherwise, they never start the project.
People with self-control problems likewise won’t start projects that are not worth doing. But they
might also delay on worthwhile projects.
People who are to some degree sophisticated about their self-control problems might not start
a project because they expect that, once the second-stage cost becomes immediate, they will no
longer deem it worthwhile to …nish the project. Because they fully anticipate any such shift in
desire, complete sophisticates, like TCs, never begin a project without completing it. Moreover,
while they might delay a short while before completing projects, sophisticates complete the project
in much the same circumstances as TCs: When their taste for immediate grati…cation is relatively
small, the discounted bene…ts need only be a little larger than the discounted costs to guarantee
that sophisticates complete the project.
Our main concern is a second source of delay for people with self-control problems: procras-
tination. People who are to any extent naive about their self-control problems may persistently
plan to work on the project in the near future, but perpetually put o¤ this work. As concluded
in many previous analyses of procrastination, this means a person might never start a worthwhile
project. But with long-term projects, a potentially more costly form of procrastination is possible:
A person might start a project that she expects to …nish, but then never …nish. In this case, the
cost of procrastination is not just the foregone bene…ts from a valuable project, but also the wasted
e¤ort incurred in working on a project that never produces any bene…ts. Indeed, we show that
such wasted-e¤ort costs can be substantial.
We also show in Section 3 that whether and how a person procrastinates depends crucially on
the structure of costs over the course of the project. Procrastination is caused by a desire to put o¤
incurring an immediate cost. The larger the cost, the stronger the urge to delay it. It is therefore
2the highest-cost stage on which people are most prone to procrastinate. Hence, for a …xed total cost,
procrastination is least likely when costs are allocated evenly across stages, because this allocation
minimizes the cost of the highest-cost stage. Moreover, when the allocation is uneven, the order of
costs is important. When a project is di¢cult to start but easy to …nish, a procrastinator is prone
not to start. When a project is easy to start but hard to …nish, a procrastinator is prone to start
but not …nish — and therefore incur costs without ever getting any bene…ts.
Our analysis in Section 3 shows how the structure of costs over the course of the project is an
important determinant of procrastination. In Section 4, we endogenize this cost structure, allowing
the person to choose an uneven allocation with a disproportionate share allocated to stage 1, or
an uneven allocation with a disproportionate share allocated to stage 2, or anything in between
including an even allocation. If, for instance, a person must put in a total of 12 hours of e¤ort but
cannot work for more than 8 hours on any given day, then she must (plan to) put in 4 to 8 hours
of e¤ort on each of two days in some combination that totals 12 hours. We show that, because the
same preference for immediate grati…cation that leads a person to procrastinate also leads her to
prefer deferring as much cost as possible to stage 2, the person is prone to choose a cost structure
that maximizes the likelihood that she will start the project but not …nish it.
In Section 5, we consider some extensions of our model to richer environments that further
illustrate the possibility of naive people incurring costs without ever receiving bene…ts. Section 6
concludes.
2. Present-Biased Preferences
The standard economics model assumes that intertemporal preferences are time-consistent:A
person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date is the same no matter
when she is asked. But there is a mass of evidence that intertemporal preferences take on a speci…c
form of time inconsistency: A person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over
a later date gets stronger as the earlier date gets closer. In other words, people have self-control
problems caused by a tendency to pursue immediate grati…cation in a way that their “long-run
s e l v e s ”d on o ta p p r e c i a t e . 3
3 See, for instance, Ainslie (1975, 1991, 1992), Ainslie and Haslam (1992a, 1992b), Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992), Thaler (1991), and Thaler and Loewenstein (1992). For a recent overview, see
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002). While the rubric of “hyperbolic discounting”
is often used to describe such preferences, the qualitative feature of the time inconsistency is
more general, and more generally supported by empirical evidence, than the speci…c hyperbolic
functional form.
3In this paper, we apply a simple form of such present-biased preferences, using a model originally
developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in the context of intergenerational altruism and later
used by Laibson (1994,1997) to model time inconsistency within an individual. Let ut be the
instantaneous utility a person gets in period t. Then her intertemporal preferences at time t, Ut,
can be represented by the following utility function:




This two-parameter model is a simple modi…cation of the standard one-parameter, exponential-
discounting model. The parameter ± represents standard “time-consistent” impatience, whereas
the parameter ¯ represents a time-inconsistent preference for immediate grati…cation. For ¯ =1 ,
these preferences are time-consistent. But for ¯<1, at any given moment the person has an extra
bias for now over the future.4
In this formulation, ¯ represents a measure of the person’s present bias or preference for immedi-
ate grati…cation. We often refer to ¯ as representing a “self-control problem” because we interpret
the preference for immediate grati…cation as being an “error” — it is a short-term feeling that the
person disagrees with at every other moment in her life. While our interpretation motivates our
language, it is not important that the reader agree with our interpretation.5
To examine intertemporal choice given time-inconsistent preferences, one must ask what a per-
son believes about her own future behavior. Most of the literature has focused on two extreme
assumptions: Sophisticated people are fully aware of their future self-control problems and there-
fore correctly predict how their future selves will behave, and naive people are fully unaware of
their future self-control problems and therefore believe their future selves will behave exactly as
they currently would like them to behave.6 Recently (O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001)), we have
4 This model has since been used by numerous authors, including Laibson (1998), Laibson,
Repetto, and Tobacman (1998), Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman and Weinberg (2001),
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b, 2001), Fischer (1999), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), and
Benabou and Tirole (2000).
5 While one’s interpretation of ¯ might in‡uence one’s belief about the proper welfare criterion,
many welfare results would hold under essentially any reasonable welfare criterion. In this paper,
we do not present any formal welfare results, although such results will be implicit. For formal
welfare results in the realm of procrastination, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,2001).
6 Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968) carefully lay out these two assumptions (and develop the labels),
but do not much consider the implications of assuming one versus the other. Most researchers
assume sophisticated beliefs — e.g., Laibson (1994,1997,1998), Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman
(1998), Angeletos et al (2001), Fischer (1999), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), and Benabou and
Tirole (2000). O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) consider both, and explicitly contrast the two.
4formulated an approach to the more realistic assumption of partial naivete wherein a person is
aware that she will have future self-control problems but underestimates their magnitude. We sup-
pose that a person has true self-control problem ¯, but perceives that in the future she will have
self-control problem ^ ¯. In other words, in any given period the person’s current preferences are
characterized by ¯, but she perceives that in the future she will behave like a sophisticated person
with preferences characterized by ^ ¯. With this formulation, people with standard time-consistent
preferences — whom we refer to as TCs — have ¯ = ^ ¯ =1 , sophisticates have ¯ = ^ ¯<1,n a i f s
have ¯<^ ¯ =1 , and partial naifs have ¯<^ ¯<1.
Our focus in this paper is on how naivete about future self-control problems can lead to pro-
crastination on long-term projects. Much of our analysis will focus on people who are completely
naive, for whom our results are strongest. But since the intuitions we identify apply even for people
who are only partially naive, we also derive results for partial naifs. In the next section, we shall
de…ne a formal solution concept — that applies to sophisticates, naifs, partial naifs, and TCs —
within our speci…c model.
3. Model with Exogenous Cost Structure
For most of our analysis, we focus for simplicity on two-stage projects; we discuss in Section
6 how our lessons extend to longer projects. A long-term project consists of two stages, and
completing each stage is onerous in the sense that completing it requires that the person incur an
immediate cost. In this section, we assume that the cost structure is exogenous, where the …rst
stage requires cost c>0 and the second stage requires cost k>0. We endogenize this structure
in Section 4.
A person carries out a long-term project because of the future bene…ts it creates. We assume that
the person must complete both stages before she can reap any bene…ts; we discuss in Section 6 how
our results extend to the case where some of the bene…ts start accruing upon partial completion.
More precisely, we assume that completion of stage 2 in period ¿ initiates a stream of bene…ts
v ¸ 0 in each period from ¿ +1onward.7
There is an in…nite number of periods in which the person can work on the project, and in
each period the person can take one of two actions: She can complete the current stage or do
7 Hence, our formal assumption is that if the person completes stage 1 in period a and stage
2i np e r i o db>a , then her instantaneous utilities are ua = ¡c, ub = ¡k, u¿ = v for all ¿ 2
fb +1 ;b+2 ;:::g,a n du¿ =0otherwise. The crucial feature of a procrastinatory environment is
that costs are immediate whereas bene…ts are delayed.
5nothing. Hence, in any period before which the person has not yet completed anything, she can
choose either to do nothing or to complete the …rst stage; and in any period before which she has
completed the …rst stage, she can choose either to do nothing or to complete the project.
Our solution concept, “perception-perfect strategies”, requires that at all times a person have
reasonable beliefs about how she would behave in the future following any possible current action,
and that she choose her current action to maximize her current preferences given these beliefs.
Perception-perfect strategies depend on the two attributes of a person discussed in Section 2 —
her self-control problem ¯, and her perceptions of future self-control problems ^ ¯.W en o wd e … n ea
formal solution concept within our speci…c model.
Let A ´f 0;1g bethesetofactions available in each period, where a =0means “do nothing” and
a =1means “complete the current stage”. Let ht 2f ; ;1;2;:::;t¡1g be a history in period t,w h e r e
ht = ; means the person has not completed stage 1 prior to period t,a n dht = ¿ 2f 1;2;:::;t ¡ 1g
means the person completed stage 1 in period ¿.Astrategy is a function s such that if the history
in period t is ht, then strategy s speci…es action s(ht;t) 2f 0;1g. In the usual game-theoretic
sense, a strategy is a plan for what to do in all possible contingencies; but we shall use strategies
to represent both a person’s true behavior and her beliefs about future behavior, which may di¤er
when ^ ¯ 6= ¯.8
Let V t(at;ht;s;¯) represent the person’s period-t preferences over current actions given history
ht and conditional on following strategy s beginning in period t +1 . Then:
V t(at;ht;s;¯) ´
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <





´ if ht = ;, at =1 ,a n d
d ´ minfx>0js(t;t + x)=1 g
¯±d
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¡c + ±d0 ³
¡k + ±v
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´i if ht = ;, at =0 ,
d ´ minfx>0js(;;t+ x)=1 g,a n d
d0 ´ minfx>0js(t + d;t + d + x)=1 g
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´ if ht = ¿ 6= ;, at =0 ,a n d
d ´ minfx>0js(¿;t+ x)=1 g.
The four cases in this equation correspond to four di¤erent possibilities of when, relative to
period t, the person completes the two stages. In the …rst case, the person completes the …rst
8 We de…ne strategies to depend on t because our notation for histories does not identify the
current period. Hence, s(¿;t) prescribes an action for period t conditional on having completed
stage 1 in period ¿. Also, our formulation rules out mixed strategies; it is perhaps best to interpret
our analysis as applying to equilibrium strategies for an in…nite horizon that correspond to some
equilibrium strategy for a long, …nite horizon, which (generically) does not involve mixed strategies.
6stage now and the second stage in the future. In the second case, the person completes both the
…rst stage and the second stage in the future. In the third case, the person has completed the …rst
stage in the past (in period ¿<t ) and completes the second stage now. In the fourth case, the
person has completed the …rst stage in the past (in period ¿<t ) and completes the second stage
in the future.
With this notation, we can provide a formal de…nition of perception-perfect strategy:
De…nition 1. Given ^ ¯, strategy b s represents ^ ¯-consistent beliefs if for all t and ht,
b s(ht;t) = arg max
a2f0;1g
V t(at;ht;b s; ^ ¯).
Given ¯ and ^ ¯, strategy s is a perception-perfect strategy if there exists ^ ¯-consistent beliefs
b s such that for all t and ht,
s(ht;t) = arg max
a2f0;1g
V t(at;ht;b s;¯).
A perception-perfect strategy represents how a person with self-control problem ¯ and percep-
tions of future self-control problems ^ ¯ would actually behave in all contingencies. A perception-
perfect strategy requires that in any situation the person must have some beliefs b s for how she
would behave in the future, and that she choose an optimal action given these beliefs and her
current preferences (which depend on ¯).9 In addition, a perception-perfect strategy requires that
the beliefs b s must be “consistent” with the person’s perception of future self-control problems ^ ¯.
De…nition 1 imposes two aspects of consistency. Beliefs are internally consistent in that, for all
possible contingencies, b s speci…es an action that is optimal given her beliefs for subsequent pe-
riods. Internal consistency implies the person perceives that in the future she will behave like a
s o p h i s t i c a t e dp e r s o nw i t hs e l f - c o n t r o lp r o b l e m^ ¯. Beliefs are also externally consistent in that the
person has the same beliefs across contingencies — that is, for all t<¿s h eh a st h es a m eb e l i e f
for what she would do in period ¿ following history h¿. This restriction rules out procrastination
arising from a form of irrational expectations that goes beyond merely mispredicting self-control,
because without it the person could repeatedly reconstruct beliefs that permit her to delay.10
Before proceeding, we must address a technical issue. For ^ ¯ =1— that is, for TCs and naifs
— there is a unique set of ^ ¯-consistent beliefs and therefore a unique perception-perfect strategy
9 Throughout we assume for simplicity that when a person is indi¤erent between a =0and a =1 ,
she chooses a =1 .
10 The restriction of external consistency matters only if there are multiple ^ ¯-consistent beliefs.
The restrictions imposed by external consistency essentially correspond to the additional restric-
tions which subgame-perfect equilibrium imposes beyond non-equilibrium backwards induction.
By the same token, these restrictions would be unnecessary in generic, …nite-period situations
where “perceptual backwards induction” would yield a unique prediction.
7(which we prove in Lemma 1 below). But for ^ ¯<1 — that is, for sophisticates and partial naifs
— there can exist multiple sets of ^ ¯-consistent beliefs and therefore multiple perception-perfect
strategies. To avoid some di¢culties, our main analysis focuses on perception-perfect strategies
with “optimistic beliefs”, which means that the person believes either that she will complete stage
2 immediately after completing stage 1 or that she will never complete stage 2. Formally:
De…nition 2. ^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s are optimistic if for all ¿ 2f 1;2;:::g either b s(¿;¿ +1 )=1
or b s(¿;¿0)=0for all ¿0 >¿.
What does our optimistic-beliefs restriction rule out? The problematic source of multiplicity is
a cyclicality in beliefs about stage-2 behavior. As will become clear, for any ^ ¯, either the unique
b s involves b s(¿;¿0)=0for all ¿0 >¿ , or there exists z 2f 1;2;:::g such that every b s involves
b s(¿;¿ + m)=1if and only if m 2f m0;m 0 + z;m0 +2 z;:::g for some m0 2f 1;:::;zg. The problem
arises in the latter case, because for z>1 there is indeterminacy in the …rst date of completion, as
determined by m0. Optimistic beliefs select m0 =1 . Our main concern shall be how many stages a
person completes, and not when she completes them. By restricting attention to optimistic beliefs
(for sophisticates and partial naifs), we get uniqueness in how many stages are completed (which
we also prove in Lemma 1 below). We note, however, that perception-perfect strategies with
optimistic beliefs and perception-perfect strategies with non-optimistic beliefs need not involve the
same number of stages completed. We discuss such issues more in Appendix A, including how
some di¢culties disappear when ± ! 1.
In this environment, there are two main reasons why a person might not complete the project.
The …rst revolves around whether the project is worth doing. The following de…nition will prove
useful for describing such e¤ects.





¸ 0, and Stage 2
is ¯-worthwhile if ¡k +
¯±v
1¡± ¸ 0.
Stage n 2f 1;2g is ¯-worthwhile if the person prefers completing the project starting from now
as opposed to never completing the project. Given optimistic beliefs, stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile if the
person prefers to complete stage 1 now and stage 2 next period as opposed to never starting the
project. Stage 2 is ¯-worthwhile if a person who has completed stage 1 prefers to complete stage 2
now as opposed to never completing stage 2. Clearly a person will complete stage n 2f 1;2g only if
that stage is ¯-worthwhile. Moreover, because a person starts the project only if she believes that
she will later …nish it, and because given perceptions ^ ¯ she predicts she’ll complete stage 2 only if
8stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile, the person will complete stage 1 only if stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile. Notice that
since TCs have time-consistent preferences, stage 1 being (¯ =1 ) -worthwhile necessarily implies
that stage 2 is (¯ =1 ) -worthwhile. For a person with present-biased preferences, in contrast, it
could be that stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile and yet stage 2 is not ¯-worthwhile.
Whether the project is worth doing in any of these senses is primarily driven by the person’s
time-consistent impatience parameter ±. In other words, it depends on whether the person gives
su¢cient weight to the future bene…ts to justify incurring the immediate costs. Indeed, for any ¯,
^ ¯, c, k,a n dv,t h e r ee x i s t s¹ ±<1 such that for all ± ¸ ¹ ±,s t a g e1i s¯-worthwhile and stage 2 is both
¯-worthwhile and ^ ¯-worthwhile. In order to abstract away from worthwhileness issues, we often
examine the limit case as ± approaches one.
The second main reason why a person might not complete the project is “procrastination” —
she views completion starting today as better than never completing the project, and she expects
to complete the project, but she repeatedly plans to start completion in the near future rather
than now. Throughout this paper, we use this very precise de…nition of procrastination.
De…nition 4. Ap e r s o nprocrastinates stage 1 if she never completes stage 1 despite it being
¯-worthwhile and stage 2 being ^ ¯-worthwhile. When a person completes stage 1, she procras-
tinates stage 2 if she never completes stage 2 despite it being ¯-worthwhile.
We use the term procrastination to mean repeatedly choosing to delay now based on a plan to
work in the near future, but then changing one’s mind when that near-future date arrives.11 In
richer, real-world environments, this cycle may eventually be broken, either because of eventual
deadlines, or because of non-stationarities in the costs and bene…ts, or because the person eventually
decides to jettison the project. In the stark, stationary environment we consider in this paper,
procrastination takes the form of an in…nite sequence of decisions to work on the project in the
near future, and hence involves in…nite delay, but it is not the in…nity of delay that is the crux.
The logic of procrastination in this environment is very much like that in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2001). Given her self-control problem ¯, for each stage the person will have some maximum
tolerable delay for completion of that stage. Formally, given ¯ and given optimistic beliefs, the
maximum tolerable delay on stage n 2f 1;2g, which we denote by d(¯;n),i sg i v e nb y
11 Hence, our de…nition of procrastination makes it almost tautological that full sophisticates
cannot procrastinate. But since our results suggest that any delay by sophisticates is limited
in severity to the in‡uence the taste for immediate grati…cation has on the overall cost-bene…t
evaluation, we feel this use is correct.
9d(¯;1) ´ max
½


























In words, d(¯;n) is the maximum delay d such that the person prefers completing stage n in d
periods rather than now. If no maximum delay exists — which holds if and only if stage n is not
¯-worthwhile — we de…ne d(¯;n)=1.
Whether the person completes stage n depends on whether she ever perceives that waiting now
w o u l dl e a dt oad e l a yo fm o r et h a nd(¯;n) periods. Her perceptions of future delay depend on her
perceived future tolerance for delay, which is given by d(^ ¯;n), where ^ ¯ ¸ ¯ implies d(^ ¯;n) · d(¯;n).
If d(^ ¯;n)+1· d(¯;n), then the maximum delay she could ever predict beginning next period is
d(^ ¯;n), and therefore she never perceives that waiting now would lead to a delay of more than
d(¯;n) periods. If, in contrast, d(^ ¯;n)=d(¯;n), then in some period she will predict delay d(^ ¯;n)
beginning next period, and therefore in that period she will perceive that waiting now would lead
to an intolerable delay of d(¯;n)+1periods. We can conclude that the person procrastinates stage
n if and only if d(^ ¯;n)+1· d(¯;n) — that is, if and only if her perceived future tolerance for
delay of stage n is at least one period shorter than her current tolerance for delay of stage n.
Because ^ ¯ = ¯ implies d(^ ¯;n)=d(¯;n), TCs and sophisticates never procrastinate. For naifs,
the logic of procrastination is quite simple: Naifs procrastinate whenever they prefer completing
stage n next period to completing stage n now (which follows formally from d(^ ¯;n)=0for ^ ¯ =1
whenever the project is worth doing). For partial naifs, the logic of procrastination is perhaps
less transparent, although a simple example helps. Consider a partial naif with d(^ ¯;1) = 2 and
d(¯;1) = 3. Given future tolerance for delay d(^ ¯;1) = 2, the person’s perceptions for future
stage-1 behavior must involve completing stage 1 every 3 periods — e.g., b s(;;t)=1if and only if
t 2f 1;4;7;:::g. Now consider the mindset of a partial naif with these beliefs. In period 1, she waits
planning/expecting to complete stage 1 in period 4. She continues with this plan until period 4
arrives, at which point she changes her mind and decides instead to wait planning/expecting to
complete stage 1 in period 7. She continues with this new plan until period 7 arrives, at which
point she decides to wait until period 10, and so on.
Having outlined the two sources of delay, we now characterize perception-perfect strategies.
Lemma 1 describes some basic properties (all proofs are collected in Appendix B):
10Lemma 1. For all ±, c, k,a n dv:
(1) For ¯ · ^ ¯ =1(for TCs and naifs), there exists a unique perception perfect strategy; and
(2) For ¯ · ^ ¯<1 (for sophisticates and partial naifs), if the person has optimistic beliefs, then
either
(a) There exists a unique perception-perfect strategy s,a n ds satis…es s(;;t)=0for all t;
(b) Any perception-perfect strategy s satis…es s(;;t)=1for some t 2f 1;2;:::;d(¯;1) + 1g but
s(t;¿)=0for all ¿>t ;o r
(c) Any perception-perfect strategy s satis…es s(;;t)=1for some t 2f 1;2;:::;d(¯;1) + 1g and
s(t;t +1 )=1 .
In our environment, there are three possible outcomes in terms of which stages the person
completes: She can never start the project, she can complete stage 1 but not stage 2, and she
can complete both stages 1 and 2. Lemma 1 establishes that we have uniqueness in which of
these occurs. Part 1 establishes that there is a unique perception-perfect strategy for TCs and
for naifs. For sophisticates and partial naifs, where there may be multiple perception-perfect
strategies, Part 2 establishes that, under the restriction to optimistic beliefs, how many stages are
completed is uniquely determined. More precisely, Lemma 1 establishes that multiple perception-
perfect strategies arise only when these types complete stage 1, and the indeterminacy is solely
about when they complete the …rst stage.
Our main results in this paper all focus solely on how many stages people complete, rather than
precisely when they complete them. This approach permits a more concise statement of our key
conclusions.12 Proposition 1 describes when a person completes the two stages:
Proposition 1. For all ¯, ^ ¯, ±, c, k,a n dv, under any perception-perfect strategy with optimistic
beliefs:
(1) The person completes stage 1 if and only if stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile, stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile,
and d(^ ¯;1) = d(¯;1);
(2) Conditional on completing stage 1, the person completes stage 2 if and only if stage 2 is
¯-worthwhile and d(^ ¯;2) = d(¯;2);a n d






























12 As discussed in some detail in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), there are ways of intuiting and
formalizing how …nite delays in completing a task (or, as here, the …rst stage of a task) are in this
context qualitatively di¤erent and less important than the in…nite delays we focus on.
11Proposition 1 formalizes the points from our earlier discussion. There are three reasons a
person might not start the project: She might feel the project is not worth doing (stage 1 is not ¯-
worthwhile); she might predict that in the future she won’t …nd the project to be worth continuing
(stage 2 is not ^ ¯-worthwhile); or she might procrastinate (d(^ ¯;1) <d (¯;1)). Similarly, conditional
on starting the project, there are two reasons a person might not …nish the project: She might
feel the project is not worth continuing (stage 2 is not ¯-worthwhile); or she might procrastinate
(d(^ ¯;2) <d (¯;2)). Part 3 describes conditions for when a person procrastinates.
As discussed above, TCs and sophisticates never procrastinate, and all that matters is the
worthwhileness of the project. Corollary 1 compares TCs and sophisticates:
Corollary 1. (1) Under their unique perception-perfect strategy, TCs either complete both stages
(immediately) or never start the project; and they complete both stages if and only if




(2) Under any perception-perfect strategy with optimistic beliefs, sophisticates either complete








TCs either complete the project or never start the project, and which they do merely depends
on whether the project is worth doing. Hence, the condition for whether TCs complete the project
is merely the standard net-present-value calculation (on utility) applied to our environment. An
important implication is that, holding constant the stage-1 net present value — holding constant
¡c ¡ ±k + ±2v
1¡± — changing the distribution of costs over the course of the project does not a¤ect
the behavior of TCs.13
Sophisticates behave much like TCs in that they either complete the project or never start the
project. Like TCs, they might not start because the project is not worthwhile — as re‡ected by
the …rst condition for sophisticates being identical to that for TCs except for incorporating the
person’s preference for immediate grati…cation. But unlike TCs, sophisticates also might not start
because they expect not to want to …nish, which occurs when stage 2 is not ¯-worthwhile — as
re‡ected by the second condition for sophisticates. This latter intuition gives rise to one way in
which the structure of costs matters for people with present-biased preferences in a way that would
be irrelevant for people with time-consistent preferences. Speci…cally, the structure of costs a¤ects
whether the person will want to complete stage 2, and in particular, holding constant the NPV
13 Indeed, changing the distribution of costs and bene…ts in a way that leaves the net present value
unchanged cannot a¤ect behavior for TCs, though it can for those with present-biased preferences.
12h




,d e c r e a s i n gc and increasing k makes it less likely that stage 2 is ¯-worthwhile,
and therefore makes it less likely that sophisticates start.
While the behavior of sophisticates can di¤er from the behavior of TCs (in terms of whether
they complete the project), Proposition 2 describes a sense in which sophisticates behave much
like TCs unless their preference for immediate grati…cation is large (¯ far from 1).
Proposition 2. De…ne C ´ c + ±k and V ´ ±2v
1¡±, so that TCs never start if and only if C=V > 1.
Then sophisticates never start only if C=V > ¯.
Proposition 2 establishes that if TCs complete the project while sophisticates don’t (for whatever
reason), it must be that the ratio of costs to bene…ts is “close” to one, in the sense of being between
¯ and one. As our results below shall illustrate, procrastination can lead naifs and partial naifs to
never start even as the ratio of costs to bene…ts approaches zero.
Worthwhileness matters for naifs and partial naifs much as it does for TCs and sophisticates.
Both naifs and partial naifs might not start the project because it is not worth doing (when stage
1i sn o t¯-worthwhile). And because partial naifs are partially sophisticated, they might not
start because they expect not to want to …nish (when stage 2 is not ^ ¯-worthwhile). This latter
conclusion implies that the cost structure can matter for partial naifs in the same way that it does
for sophisticates.
We doubt, however, the importance of misbehavior driven by worthwhileness concerns; for
instance, one could formalize a sense in which the degree of harm from any such misbehavior
can be large only if ¯ is signi…cantly less than 1. For the remainder of this section, we explore
procrastination by people who are (at least partially) naive. In order to lay bare the forces that
in‡uence procrastination, we examine behavior when ± ! 1. A sd i s c u s s e da b o v e ,i nt h i sc a s e
everything is worthwhile, and therefore the only reason a person might not complete the project
is procrastination.
Proposition 3 characterizes how the di¤erent types behave when ± ! 1:
Proposition 3. When ± ! 1, for any c, k,a n dv:
(1) If ¯ = ^ ¯ · 1, the person completes the project;
(2) If ¯<^ ¯ =1 , the person completes stage 1 if and only if c<
¯v
1¡¯, and if she completes stage
1, then she completes stage 2 if and only if k<
¯v
1¡¯;a n d
(3) If ¯<^ ¯<1, the person completes stage 1 if c<
¯v
1¡¯ and only if c<
¯v
1¡¯=^ ¯,a n di fs h e
completes stage 1, then she completes stage 2 if k<
¯v
1¡¯ and only if k<
¯v
1¡¯=^ ¯.
13Part 1 captures the intuition that everything is worth doing when ± ! 1, so both TCs and
sophisticates complete the project. Parts 2 and 3 characterize when naifs and partial naifs pro-
crastinate. Proposition 3 yields several interesting conclusions about procrastination.14
First, notice that whether naifs procrastinate a stage is monotonic in the stage cost — that
is, the larger is the stage cost, the more likely it is that naifs procrastinate that stage. Although
this basic intuition appears in many previous papers on time-inconsistent procrastination, we
emphasize it because our new results rely on it heavily. A similar intuition holds for partial naifs,
except for a possible zone in which whether partial naifs procrastinate is non-monotonic in the stage
cost. The source of this non-monotonicity is the discreteness of d(^ ¯;n) and d(¯;n). If the stage
cost is small enough, then d(^ ¯;n)=d(¯;n)=0and therefore the person doesn’t procrastinate.
If the stage cost is large enough, then we can guarantee that d(^ ¯;n) <d (¯;n), and therefore
the person procrastinates. But for intermediate stage costs, we cannot tell whether the person
procrastinates.15
Second, notice that two types of procrastination potentially arise when a person who is not
completely sophisticated faces a long-term project. First, there is the “classical” form highlighted
in previous procrastination papers, wherein a person plans to start a valuable project but never
does so. But here a person might instead start a valuable project planning to …nish it, but never
…nish it. This latter form of procrastination is clearly worse, because the person incurs the cost
associated with starting the project without ever accruing any bene…ts. In fact, Proposition 4
establishes that there is in principle no bound on how much e¤ort a person might exert in starting
a project she does not …nish.
Proposition 4. For all ¯, ±,a n d^ ¯>¯ , for any c there exists k and v such that the person
completes stage 1 but never completes stage 2.
The third — and most interesting — implication of Proposition 3 is that the structure of costs
matters dramatically for whether a person procrastinates. Consider the behavior of naifs. Because
Proposition 3 implies that naifs complete the project if and only if maxfc;kg <
¯v
1¡¯,t h eallocation
of costs over the course of the project becomes crucial. In particular, for any …xed total cost, naifs
are most likely to complete the project when these costs are allocated evenly over the course of
14 All of our qualitative conclusions when ± ! 1 also hold when ±<1, but the equations become
more complicated.
15 More precisely, d(¯;n) is the largest integer smaller than ~ d(¯;n) ´ (1 ¡ ¯)c=(¯v),a n dd(^ ¯;n)
is therefore the largest integer smaller than ~ d(^ ¯;n). Clearly, ~ d(¯;n)¡ ~ d(^ ¯;n) is strictly increasing
in c. Indeed, it is the condition ~ d(¯;n) ¡ ~ d(^ ¯;n) > 1 that guarantees d(^ ¯;n) <d (¯;n).B u t f o r
~ d(¯;n) ¡ ~ d(^ ¯;n) < 1, it is unclear whether d(¯;n)=d(^ ¯;n) or d(¯;n)=d(^ ¯;n)+1 .
14the project. If total costs are ¡, naifs are most likely to complete the project when c = k =¡ =2,
and least likely to complete the project when c =¡or k =¡ . The intuition for the role of
allocation is simple: Naifs complete the project if and only if they don’t procrastinate the highest-
cost stage. If a disproportionate share of the costs are allocated to stage 1, then the person is prone
to procrastinate starting the project; and if a disproportionate share of the costs are allocated to
stage 2, then the person is prone to procrastinate …nishing the project.
When costs are allocated unevenly, the order of costs is important, because it determines
whether naifs incur costs without accruing bene…ts. If both costs are su¢ciently low that the
person would not procrastinate either stage, or if both costs are su¢ciently high that the person
would procrastinate both stages, then the order of costs is irrelevant. But if costs are such that the
person would procrastinate the high-cost stage but not the low-cost stage, then the person never
starts when the high-cost stage comes …rst, whereas the person starts but doesn’t …nish when the
high-cost stage comes second. Hence, naifs are better o¤ when the high-cost stage comes …rst —
that is, when minfc;kg = k.
Proposition 3 suggests similar intuitions hold for partial naifs as well. Because partial naifs, like
naifs, are more prone to procrastinate a stage the higher is the cost of that stage, the allocation
of costs and order of costs can matter for partial naifs in the same way that it matters for naifs.
But because of the non-monotonicities for partial naifs discussed above, it is possible to construct
examples where these e¤ects are reversed.16
4. Model with Endogenous Cost Structure
The previous section shows how the behavior of people with present-biased preferences depends
critically on the structure of costs over the course of a project. In this section, we endogenize this
structure. We show that in such situations people who are (at least partially) naive are in fact
prone to choose cost structures for which they are likely to start but not …nish the project.
To motivate our formal analysis, consider a person who must complete an unpleasant project
at work that requires a total of 12 hours of e¤ort. The person can put in these hours in any way
16 Interestingly, there are situations where partial naifs can su¤er worse outcomes than either
extreme. Partial naifs are less likely to procrastinate any given stage than are naifs. But this
means that in situations where naifs never start the project, if their partial sophistication overcomes
procrastination at stage 1 but does not overcome procrastination at stage 2, then partial naifs start
but do not …nish the project. Hence, no matter whether sophisticates complete the project or never
start in such situations, clearly both naifs and sophisticates experience better outcomes than do
partial naifs.
15that she wants, except that she cannot work for more than 8 hours on any given day, so that the
project requires (at least) two days of work. But the person has discretion over how to allocate
her time over those two days. What work schedule will the person choose?
Formally, we assume the person must choose a cost structure
(c;k) 2f (x;y) j x + y = A;x · ¹ a;y · ¹ ag´PA;¹ a.
This formulation incorporates two assumptions. First, the total cost to be incurred, which we
denote by A, is independent of the cost structure — that is, both the disutility and the bene…ts of
an hour’s worth of e¤ort are assumed to be independent of when the e¤ort is put in. We address
at the end of this section how e¢ciency concerns might alter our conclusions. Second, there is a
maximum cost ¹ a that can be incurred in any speci…c period. To make it meaningful that we are
analyzing “long-term projects”, it must be that the person cannot choose to complete the project
all at once, because otherwise TCs would choose to do so and naifs would plan to do so. We assume
A 2 (¹ a;2¹ a), which makes it a two-period project.17
Our formal analysis restricts the person to incur costs in at most two periods. This restriction is
irrelevant for TCs and naifs: Because there is no value to dividing up the costs more than necessary,
and because TCs and naifs are merely maximizing (actual or perceived) preferences, they always
plan to complete the task in a total of two days. But this restriction can be substantive for
sophisticates and partial naifs: Because they are worried about future misbehavior, there may be
value to further dividing up the costs if doing so in‡uences future behavior.
Importantly, the person makes her choice of cost structure at the moment of action. Hence, if
in period t the person has waited in all prior periods, then in period t she can choose either to
wait again or to incur any cost x 2 [A¡¹ a;¹ a] while planning to incur cost A¡x next period (given
optimistic beliefs). If, in contrast, the person has incurred cost x 2 [A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a] in the past, then
in period t she can choose either to wait or to incur cost A ¡ x to …nish the project. As in our
basic model, the person receives an in…nite stream of bene…ts with per-period bene…t v ¸ 0 upon
completion of the project.
In this environment, the person is e¤ectively making a choice between many possible projects
— the person can choose any project in PA;¹ a.W ed e … n ep¤(P) to be the person’s preferred project
within a set of projects P.F o r m a l l y ,












if P0(P) is non-empty
; if P0(P) is empty
where
P0(P) ´f (c;k) 2 P j stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile and stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhileg.
In words, the person’s preferred project is the project that maximizes her preferences subject to
the condition that she wants and expects to complete it. Note that the preferred project depends
on ¯, and hence is the preferred project given the person’s preference for immediate grati…cation.
If there is no project that the person wants and expects to complete, then we say that the person
does not have a preferred project. Clearly, if a person starts any project, it will be her preferred
project; and if she has no preferred project, then she never does anything. The following lemma
characterizes a person’s preferred project.
Lemma 2. For any ¯, ±, v, A,a n d¹ a such that A 2 (¹ a;2¹ a):
(1) If ^ ¯ =1(for TCs and naifs), either p¤(PA;¹ a)=; or p¤(PA;¹ a)=( A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a);
(2) If ^ ¯<1 (for sophisticates and partial naifs), either p¤(PA;¹ a)=; or p¤(PA;¹ a)=( A ¡ x0;x 0)







(3) When ± ! 1, p¤(PA;¹ a)=( A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a) for all ^ ¯.
Lemma 2 captures the intuition that when the cost structure is endogenous, people will prefer
to defer as much of the cost as possible to the second stage. Part 1 establishes that for TCs and
naifs, the preferred project (if it exists) involves deferring the maximum possible amount ¹ a to the
second stage. Part 2 establishes a similar result for sophisticates and partial naifs, but with a
caveat: Because the person expects to have future self-control problems, she will not allocate so
much cost to stage 2 so as to make stage 2 not ^ ¯-worthwhile, which requires that the stage-2 cost
be no larger than
^ ¯±v
1¡±. Finally, Part 3 establishes that when ± ! 1, in which case everything
is worthwhile, all types plan to incur the maximum cost ¹ a in stage 2. This propensity to defer
costs is driven by both the person’s time-consistent impatience, as captured by ±,a n dt h ep e r s o n ’ s
preference for immediate grati…cation, as captured by ¯.
In order to explore the implications of “endogenizing the cost structure,” we compare a person’s
behavior given exogenous cost structure (c;k) to her behavior given endogenous cost structure
Pendog(c;k) ´f (x;y) j x + y = c + k;x · ¹ a;y · ¹ ag. We assume c · ¹ a, k · ¹ a,a n dc + k>¹ a,s o
17that we are comparing behavior under exogenous cost structure (c;k) to behavior under endogenous
cost structure Pendog(c;k) when (c;k) 2 Pendog(c;k). Proposition 5 describes how endogenizing
the cost structure a¤ects the worthwhileness of the project.
Proposition 5. For any ±<1, v, ¹ a,a n d(c;k) with c;k · ¹ a and c + k>¹ a:
(1) For any ¯ and ^ ¯, if project (c;k) has stage 1 ¯-worthwhile and stage 2 ^ ¯-worthwhile, then
p¤(Pendog(c;k)) exists and has stage 1 ¯-worthwhile and stage 2 ^ ¯-worthwhile; and
(2) For ¯ = ^ ¯ · 1 (for TCs and sophisticates), and given optimistic beliefs for sophisticates, if
the person completes the project under exogenous cost structure (c;k), then she completes the
project under endogenous cost structure Pendog(c;k).
Part 1 establishes that endogenizing the cost structure makes it more likely that the project is
worth doing, and also makes it more likely that the person expects to want to …nish. The intuition
for the former result is that, with discounting, for any …xed total cost, allocating more of that
cost to the second stage makes it more likely that the project is worth doing. The intuition for
the latter result is that the person chooses the cost structure accounting for her perceived stage-
2 incentives. Part 2 establishes that endogenizing the cost structure makes it more likely that
TCs and sophisticates complete the project. This follows immediately from Part 1, because TCs
complete the project if and only if stage 1 is (¯ =1 ) -worthwhile, and sophisticates complete the
project if and only if both stages are ¯-worthwhile:
Considerations of whether completing the project is worthwhile are relevant for naifs and partial
n a i f sa sw e l l ,a n ds of o r±<1 endogenizing the cost structure may make it more likely that they
complete the project. But endogenizing the cost structure might also in‡uence whether naifs and
partial naifs procrastinate. In order to lay bare the implications of endogenizing the cost structure
for procrastination, we again examine behavior when ± ! 1, in which case the above worthwhileness
considerations disappear. Proposition 6 formalizes a stark contrast in the e¤ects of endogenizing
cost structure between sophisticates and naifs.
Proposition 6. When ± ! 1, for any v, ¹ a,a n d(c;k) with c;k · ¹ a and c + k>¹ a:
(1) If ¯ = ^ ¯ · 1, the person completes the project both under exogenous cost structure (c;k) and
under endogenous cost structure Pendog(c;k);a n d
(2) If ¯<^ ¯ =1 , the person starts the project under endogenous cost structure Pendog(c;k) if she
starts the project under exogenous cost structure (c;k), and she completes the project under
endogenous cost structure Pendog(c;k) only if she completes the project under exogenous cost
structure (c;k).
18Part 1 merely restates our earlier conclusion that when ± ! 1, everything is worth doing, and so
TCs and sophisticates always complete the project. Part 2 establishes that for naifs, endogenizing
the cost structure makes it more likely that they start the project, while at the same time makes it
less likely that they complete the project. The intuition is simple. We saw in Section 3 that naifs
are prone to start but not …nish when a disproportionate share of the total cost is allocated to
stage 2. When the cost structure is endogenized, the same preference for immediate grati…cation
that leads the person to procrastinate also leads the person to defer as much of the total cost as is
possible to stage 2. Hence, she is prone to choose a cost structure on which she is prone to start
but not …nish.18
Our results in Proposition 6 can be interpreted in terms of an intuition identi…ed in O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001). One of the main results in that paper is that providing a person with additional
options can make procrastination more likely. This outcome occurs when some new option is better
than existing options from a long-run perspective but more onerous to carry out, because then the
person will plan to do the new option, but may repeatedly put o¤ incurring the high immediate
cost. While that paper demonstrates that one can construct examples in which expanded choice
exacerbates procrastination, one can also construct examples in which it mitigates procrastination.
Here, by contrast, we show that a natural way to expand choice — giving people discretion over
how to schedule their e¤orts — unambiguously makes (pure) naifs more prone to procrastinate.
Our results above are also suggestive of the implications of endogenizing the cost structure in
a di¤erent way. Suppose that, rather than being able to allocate the total costs in a continuous
fashion, a person must complete a project that consists of speci…c sub-component tasks, and
can choose only the order of these tasks. In other words, given exogenous cost structure (c;k),
endogenizing the cost structure in this way means the set of possible projects is P ´f (c;k);(k;c)g.
Applying the logic from Lemma 2, the preferred project p¤(P) involves doing the low-cost stage
…rst and the high-cost stage second — that is, deferring as much cost as possible to stage 2.
Applying the logic from Proposition 5, endogenizing the order can make it more likely that any
type completes the project because she …nds it worthwhile. In terms of procrastination, applying
the logic from Proposition 6, endogenizing the order does not change whether the person completes
the project. But if she doesn’t complete the project, endogenizing the order makes it more likely
that the person starts the project without …nishing it.
18 For partial naifs, a similar intuition holds. Just like naifs, endogenizing the cost structure leads
partial naifs to allocate a disproportionate share of the costs to stage 2, and hence makes them
prone to start but not …nish the project. But because of the non-monotonicities discussed in
Section 3, endogenizing the cost structure can have essentially any e¤ect on partial naifs.
19We conclude this section by extending our analysis to the case where the choice of cost structure
has e¢ciency implications — that is, di¤erent cost structures imply di¤erent total costs. In order
to incorporate this possibility, we modify the set of possible cost structures to be of the form
f(x;y) j h(x)+h(y)=A;x · ¹ a;y · ¹ ag
where h0 > 0 and A 2 (h(¹ a);2h(¹ a)). We can interpret A to be the number of “e¤ective hours”
required, and h(a) to be the number of e¤ective hours accumulated when a hours are spent.19 We
distinguish between two cases, increasing returns to e¤ort, h00 > 0, and decreasing returns to e¤ort,
h00 < 0.
Some additional notation will be useful. First, we de…ne ~ Pendog(c;k) analogously to Pendog(c;k):
Given exogenous cost structure (c;k),w ed e … n e
~ Pendog(c;k) ´f (x;y) j h(x)+h(y)=h(c)+h(k);x· ¹ a;y · ¹ ag,
w h e r ew ea s s u m eh(c)+h(k) 2 (h(¹ a);2h(¹ a)). Second, we de…ne x¤ to satisfy 2h(x¤)=h(c)+h(k).
That is, x¤ represents the per-stage cost for the project if it were to be completed with an even
allocation of e¤ort. Finally, we de…ne x(y)=h¡1 ([h(c)+h(k)] ¡ h(y)).I fy is the cost allocated
to one stage, then x(y) is the cost required in the other stage.
The following proposition characterizes behavior for naifs:
Proposition 7. When ± ! 1 and ¯<^ ¯ =1 , for any v, ¹ a,a n d(c;k) with c;k · ¹ a and
h(c)+h(k) 2 (h(¹ a);2h(¹ a)):




=( x(¹ a);¹ a), and the person completes the project under
endogenous cost structure ~ Pendog(c;k) only if she completes the project under exogenous cost
structure (c;k);a n d




=( x(y¤);y¤) for some y¤ 2 (x¤;¹ a].I fy¤ ¸ maxfc;kg,t h e nt h e
person completes the project under endogenous cost structure ~ Pendog(c;k) only if she completes
the project under exogenous cost structure (c;k).I fy¤ < maxfc;kg, then the person completes
the project under endogenous cost structure ~ Pendog(c;k) if she completes the project under
exogenous cost structure (c;k).
Proposition 7 describes how the interaction of cost allocation and e¢ciency matters for pro-
crastination. E¢ciency considerations represent another force that in‡uences the choice of cost
structure. Part 1 establishes that if there are increasing returns to e¤ort, then the conclusions in
Part 2 of Proposition 6 still hold. Intuitively, if there are increasing returns to e¤ort, then e¢ciency
19 Alternatively, we could interpret A to be the number of actual hours required, and x to be the
immediate disutility associated with working h(x) hours.
20considerations militate in favor of an uneven allocation (since it is most e¢cient to try to do as
much as possible on the longer day), and hence reinforce the propensity of naive procrastinators to
defer as much cost as possible to the future.20 Part 2 establishes that if there are decreasing returns
to e¤ort, in contrast, it is ambiguous whether endogenizing the cost structure leads to more or less
procrastination. With decreasing returns to e¤ort, e¢ciency considerations militate in favor of an
even allocation, and hence the person’s preferred project need not involve deferring as much cost
as possible to stage 2. As a result, the e¤ects of endogenizing the cost structure depend on how the
allocation associated with the preferred project compares to the initial exogenous cost structure.
5. Recurrent Procrastination Costs
In this section we consider some extensions of our model that further illustrate the possibility
of naive people incurring costs without ever receiving bene…ts.
Our basic model explores when a person might procrastinate a single long-term project. Our
…rst extension examines how the person’s behavior might change when she can complete a series of
independent long-term projects. Suppose there are N identical long-term projects that the person
might complete, each with cost structure (c;k), and completion of a project in period ¿ initiates a
stream of bene…ts v>0 each period from ¿ +1onward. In each period, the person can complete
at most one stage of at most one project. Hence, she has three types of options each period: start
a new project (if not all projects have been started), complete a started project (if one exists), or
do nothing. For N =1 , this model is equivalent to our basic model in Section 3. To focus our
discussion on procrastination, we examine behavior when ± ! 1.
In this environment, TCs start and …nish all N projects in succession — that is, in period 1
they start a project, in period 2 they …nish that project; in period 3 they start a second project,
in period 4 they …nish the second project; and so forth until they have completed all N projects.
Intuitively, when ± ! 1, all projects are worth doing, and, to initiate the bene…ts of each project
as soon as possible, it is always better to …nish a started project before starting a new project.
Proposition 8 characterizes the behavior of naifs in this environment:
20 Indeed, endogenizing the cost structure makes procrastination more likely even if the person
has the option to complete the entire project on one day, which would hold if h(¹ a)=h(c)+h(k).
In that case, increasing returns to e¤ort lead naifs to always plan to complete the project on one
day, but that one day might always be tomorrow. In this case, the person would not incur costs
without bene…ts.
21Proposition 8. When ± ! 1 and ¯<^ ¯ =1 , for any c, k, v,a n dN:
(1) Naifs start a new project only if they have (strictly) more than nPS unstarted projects, and















(2) Naifs start n¤
S ´ maxf0;N¡nPSg projects and …nish n¤
F ´ minfmaxf0;N¡nPFg;n ¤
sg projects;
and
(3) If c ¸ k and n¤
S > 0, naifs start and …nish n¤
S projects in succession; and if c<kand n¤
S > 0,
naifs …rst start nI projects, and then alternate between …nishing and starting until they have
started n¤
S projects and …nished n¤
F projects, where nI ´ min
n





In Part 1 of Proposition 8, the variables nPS and nPF represent the number of projects that
naifs might procrastinate starting and …nishing, respectively. Part 2 uses these conclusions to
characterize how many projects naifs start, n¤
S, and how many projects they …nish, n¤
F.S p e c i … c a l l y ,
the person starts N ¡ nPS projects, unless N · nPS, in which case she never starts any project.
Similarly, the person …nishes N ¡ nPF projects, unless either N · nPF, in which case she never
…nishes any started projects, or n¤
S <N¡ nPF, in which case she …nishes every project that she
starts. Parts 1 and 2 demonstrate how the possibility of procrastination extends to the availability
of multiple projects. Both n¤
S and n¤
F are increasing in N — the more projects a person faces,
the more projects she starts, and the more projects she …nishes. Intuitively, when a person would
procrastinate on a single project, facing multiple projects can help motivate her not to procrastinate
because waiting imposes a delay on all projects that the person expects to complete in the future.
But while facing multiple projects can help counteract procrastination, it doesn’t eliminate it. In
particular, both nPS and nPF are independent of N. Hence, if, for instance, nPS =4 ,t h e nf o r
N · 4 naifs never start any projects, and for N>4 naifs never start exactly four projects.
Part 3 demonstrates how our results about the allocation of costs extends to facing multiple
projects. When for each project the high-cost stage comes …rst, naifs …nish immediately all projects
that they start. Much as in our basic model, naifs are more prone to procrastinate the high-cost
stage, and so if the high-cost stage comes …rst, naifs …nish every project that they start. In contrast,
when the low-cost stage comes …rst, naifs might start projects but then never …nish them. Indeed,
it is easy to construct examples in which n¤
S = N and n¤
F =0 , so that naifs start all N projects
22and never …nish any of them.21 Also notice that, whereas the person should …nish started projects
before she starts new projects, when the low-cost stage comes …rst she might instead start new
projects before she …nishes started projects, and hence carry around an “inventory” of started but
not completed projects. This distortion is driven by the same preference for immediate grati…cation
that generates procrastination: When choosing which of two onerous activities to do …rst, people
are biased towards choosing the less onerous activity.
Our second extension examines a natural class of long-term projects wherein stage 1 represents
preliminary “search” while stage 2 represents “development”. Consider, for example, a Ph.D.
student writing her dissertation. Stage 1 can be interpreted as the period of time during which
the graduate student pursues a new idea and develops some preliminary results. After completing
stage 1, the student, with guidance from her advisor, can assess the likely quality of a dissertation
based on these preliminary results. The student must then decide whether to pursue those results
— i.e., to complete stage 2 of that project — or to begin working on some new idea — i.e., to
complete stage 1 of a new project.
To capture such situations, we suppose that “completing stage 1” means the person incurs an
immediate cost c ¸ 0 and then learns the ‡ow bene…t v that she would receive upon completing
that project. We assume v is distributed according to cumulative distribution function F(¢) that
is continuous, strictly increasing, and di¤erentiable over support [0;1). The student knows F(¢)
before completing the …rst stage but learns v only upon completing the …rst stage. Once she has
drawn such a v, in any later period she can …nish that project by incurring cost k ¸ 0,a f t e r
which she will receive the bene…t v in all subsequent periods. But the person can also choose to
complete stage 1 of a new project so as to …nd a higher bene…t, where we assume the bene…ts are
independent across draws, and the person can complete stage 2 of at most one project. Hence,
in each period the person has three options: she can complete stage 1 of a new project, she can
complete stage 2 of any previously begun project (clearly choosing the highest bene…t v), or she
can do nothing.
Lemma 3 characterizes the behavior of TCs and naifs in this environment.
21 If we were to endogenize the cost structure as in Section 4, naifs would choose to decrease c and
increase k, which would imply that n¤
S increases while n¤
F decreases. We are wary of such results,
however, because it’s unclear how valid it is to merge our new assumption of completing at most
one stage of at most one project per day with our earlier interpretation of allocating hours over
the day.
23Lemma 3. For all c, k,a n dF(¢):
(1) There is a unique perception-perfect strategy for TCs. This strategy generates one of the
following two paths of behavior: (i) they never do anything; or (ii) there exists ¹ v¤ > 0 such that
they complete stage 1 each period until they draw a bene…t v ¸ ¹ v¤, and then …nish that project
the subsequent period.
(2) There is a unique perception-perfect strategy for naifs. This strategy generates one of the
following two paths of behavior: (i) they never do anything; or (ii) there exists ¹ vn > 0 and
¹ vnn ¸ ¹ vn such that they complete stage 1 each period until they draw a bene…t v ¸ ¹ vn,a n d
then they …nish that project the subsequent period if v ¸ ¹ vnn, and otherwise they never …nish
(i.e., they do nothing in all subsequent periods).
To see how present-biased preferences can distort behavior, consider how naifs behave in com-
parison to TCs. If TCs never search, then clearly naifs also never search. But when TCs …nd
it optimal to search, naifs might di¤er from TCs in three ways. First, naifs might never search,
either because they view searching as not ¯-worthwhile or because they procrastinate. Second,
when naifs search and eventually draw a bene…t large enough that they plan to complete that
project, they may never complete the project due to procrastination. Finally, naifs might search
with a di¤erent cuto¤ than TCs — that is, ¹ vn 6=¹ v¤. Proposition 9 describes how the cost structure
in‡uences which of these distortions might occur:
Proposition 9. Suppose c, k,a n dF(¢) are such that TCs search with cuto¤ ¹ v¤ > 0.
(1) If c = k, naifs either never search or behave exactly like TCs;
(2) If c>k , naifs either never search or search with cuto¤ ¹ vn < ¹ v¤ and …nish that project; and
(3) If c<k , naifs either never search or search with cuto¤ ¹ vn ¸ ¹ v¤ and then …nish that project
if and only if v ¸ ¹ vnn,w h e r e¹ vnn ¸ ¹ vn.
Proposition 9 establishes that, once again, naifs incur costs without bene…ts only if …nishing is
more onerous than starting. More precisely, for c ¸ k, if naifs search at all, then they will eventually
complete some project, while for c<k , they might search but never complete any project. To
illustrate this latter result, suppose c =2 0 , k =9 5 ,a n dv is distributed uniformly on [0;1]. TCs
with ± = :9999 search with cuto¤ ¹ v¤ = :9353 and then immediately …nish; naifs with ± = :9999
and ¯ = :99 search with cuto¤ ¹ vn = :9364 but …nish that project if and only if v ¸ ¹ vnn = :9692.
In this example, it is well worth …nding a project with high bene…ts, and so TCs and naifs both
search extensively — they both sample, on average, between 15 and 16 projects. But while TCs
immediately …nish once they …nd a satisfactory project, naifs might procrastinate. Indeed, in this
example, despite their extensive sampling, the likelihood that naifs complete their chosen project
24is only 48%. But it is also the case that naifs who …nish have projects that are on average 2%
better than TCs.
Proposition 9 also establishes that, when deciding whether to …nish a started project vs. search-
ing further, naifs are biased towards choosing the activity that is less onerous. Speci…cally, condi-
tional on searching, if c>k , naifs are too prone to …nish an existing project and therefore ¹ vn < ¹ v¤;
and if c<k , naifs are too prone to start a new project and therefore ¹ vn > ¹ v¤.W h e nc = k,t h e r e
is no distortion of this type, and so conditional on searching, naifs behave exactly like TCs.
Consider our example of a graduate student working on her dissertation. Proposition 9 implies
that people who …nd preliminary work enjoyable but dislike the process of revising and polishing
(i.e., have a low c and high k) tend to keep starting projects and not …nish ones that they should.
They will take too long to …nish their dissertations, and end up with a dissertation whose quality is
“too high” in the sense that their long-run well-being would have been higher had they had lower
standards for their topic. In contrast, people who dislike preliminary work but enjoy the process
of revising and polishing (i.e., have a high c and low k) tend not to search long enough. While
they are prone to never get started on their dissertations, they …nish whenever they start, but are
likely to end up with a low-quality dissertation.22
Our …nal extension is perhaps our most striking demonstration of people incurring recurrent
costs without ever receiving bene…ts. For many long-term projects, if a person starts a project
but then delays before …nishing, she must repeat some of her initial e¤orts. If, for instance, she
works out preliminary results on a research project but then procrastinates in writing the paper,
after a while she will not be able to write the paper without reviewing her earlier analysis. In such
environments, naive people might repeatedly work out the same preliminary results without ever
writing the paper.
To formalize this situation, we return to the case of a single two-stage project, where the cost
structure (c;k) is exogenous and completion of the project in period ¿ initiates a stream of bene…ts
v>0 in each period from ¿ +1onward. To introduce decay of earlier e¤orts in a particularly stark
manner, we suppose that if the person does not …nish the project immediately after starting, then
she will have to completely re-do the …rst stage. To focus on the implications for procrastination,
we once again examine behavior when ± ! 1.
When there is decay, TCs clearly start and then …nish the project immediately just as they
would without decay. Proposition 10 describes the behavior of naifs:
22 It is interesting to note that when c>k , sophistication can exacerbate the problem of settling
for low bene…ts, because knowing she will settle for low bene…ts in the future in fact makes a person
more prone to settle for a low bene…ts now.
25Proposition 10. Suppose ± ! 1 and ¯<^ ¯ =1 .I fc ¸
¯v










1¡¯ , then naifs repeatedly start the project but then delay …nishing.
A comparison of Proposition 10 to Proposition 3 reveals three things of note. First, the pos-
sibility of decay does not a¤ect whether naifs start the project. Intuitively, naifs never expect to
delay, so the possibility of decay caused by delay seems irrelevant to them. Second, the possibility
of decay makes it less likely that naifs procrastinate stage 2. Without decay, waiting merely means
delaying …nishing by one period. With decay, in contrast, waiting means delaying …nishing by two
periods and, importantly, having to incur the stage-1 cost for a second time. Hence, the costs of
delay are larger with decay, making naifs more motivated to complete stage 2. But third, when
this extra motivation is not enough to prevent procrastination at stage 2, naifs su¤er a particularly
unfortunate outcome: They repeatedly start the project but delay …nishing, and hence incur the
stage 1 cost over and over again.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
Our analysis in this paper identi…es a number of results about time-inconsistent procrastination
on long-term projects. While our formal analysis focuses on a highly stylized environment, we are
con…dent that most of our conclusions apply qualitatively to more general settings. For instance,
while our model focuses on two-stage projects, the lessons can be readily extended to longer-term
projects. The key intuition that drives many of our results is that a person is most prone to
procrastinate on the highest-cost stage, and this intuition clearly generalizes. Hence, for many-
stage projects, if the highest-cost stage comes …rst, naive people will either complete the project or
never start, whereas if the highest-cost stage occurs later, they might start the project but never
…nish. Indeed, if the highest-cost stage comes last, naive people might complete every stage of a
many-stage project except the last stage, and as a result may expend nearly all of the total cost
required to complete the project without receiving bene…ts.23
While our model assumes that no bene…ts accrue until after the entire project is completed,
our results would also hold qualitatively if the person gets partial bene…ts from partial completion.
Moreover, …xing the total bene…t, if some of this bene…t accrues upon partial completion, the
person is, in fact, less likely to complete the project. Intuitively, allocating more bene…t following
23 As an extreme example, if a project involves 1000 days of e¤ort c =8and just one day of e¤ort
c =1 6 , a naive person might put in 1000 days of “low” e¤ort and yet never …nish the project.
26completion of stage 1 and less bene…t following completion of stage 2 is much like allocating less
cost to stage 1 and more cost to stage 2. Hence, if the person gets partial bene…ts from partial
completion, then she is more prone to start but not …nish the project, although the cost of doing
so may be smaller.
The results in this paper highlight some more general themes. First, the microstructure —
or …ne details — of environments are important for people with time-inconsistent preferences in
ways that don’t matter for people with standard time-consistent preferences. Time-inconsistent
people react to the same long-run incentives that time-consistent people react to — e.g., ceteris
paribus, the higher the bene…ts and the lower the total e¤ort costs, the more likely are naive
procrastinators to complete a project quickly. But time-inconsistent people also react to other,
short-run details. Our analysis in Section 4 on endogenizing the microstructure (the cost structure)
extends this theme by illustrating that we should not necessarily expect people to choose the best
microstructure.
Our analysis in Section 5 suggests that procrastination need not take the form of doing nothing
at all, but rather might take the form of performing a low-cost activity rather than a high-cost
activity. This distortion can be important whenever a person has a number of activities she might
carry out and, because of time constraints, can only carry out some of them. For instance, new
assistant professors have limited time to allocate between research and teaching. From numerous
anecdotal conversations with colleagues, we suspect that some failures to do signi…cant research
can be attributed to procrastination in the form of allocating too much time to lower-cost teaching
activities.
Finally, we note that the results in this paper could, if ‡eshed out, have implications in designing
incentives to combat procrastination — both from a managerial perspective and from a government-
policy perspective. In O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b), we explore a simple model of designing a
reward scheme to combat procrastination. Our analysis in the present paper suggests not just
the importance of designing reward schemes, but also — to the extent possible — of designing
projects themselves. For instance, because our analysis in Section 4 shows the potential drawbacks
of giving people too much ‡exibility in how they pursue a project, it suggests that a …rm might
want to demand a particular schedule of work on a project. Taking our simple model literally,
for instance, would suggest that even if there were variation among employees in their disutility
of di¤erent parts of a project, it might help to impose virtually any schedule on employees rather
than to leave it to each employee’s own discretion.
27Appendix A: Non-Optimistic Beliefs
In this appendix, we describe how our conclusions might change if we were to relax the optimistic-
beliefs restriction. We remind the reader that there is a unique perception-perfect strategy for TCs
and naifs, who have ^ ¯ =1 ; the statements in this appendix apply only for sophisticates and partial
naifs, who have ^ ¯<1.
Consider …rst what non-optimistic beliefs are possible. Suppose the person’s perceived tolerance
for delay of stage 2 is d(^ ¯;2) = z>0.I fb s represents ^ ¯-consistent beliefs, then for every ¿ 2f 1;2;:::g
there exists m0 2f 1;:::;z +1 g such that b s(¿;¿ + m)=1if and only if m 2f m0;m 0 +(z +1);m 0 +
2(z +1 ) ;:::g. The optimistic-beliefs restriction requires m0 =1for all ¿. But clearly many other,
non-optimistic beliefs are possible. We use the following terminology below: Beliefs are pessimistic
if m0 = z +1for all ¿; and beliefs are stationary if m0 is the same for all ¿ (so optimistic and
pessimistic beliefs are both stationary). Also, we use the abbreviation PPS for perception-perfect
strategy.
To illustrate one way in which non-optimistic beliefs might change our conclusions, consider
how a PPS for sophisticates with optimistic beliefs might di¤er from a PPS for sophisticates with











¸ 0. If the former
inequality holds while the latter does not, then any PPS with optimistic beliefs involves completing
the project, whereas any PPS with pessimistic beliefs involves never starting the project.24 This
example re‡ects a more general result: For worthwhileness reasons, having non-optimistic beliefs
can make it more likely that sophisticates never start the project (relative to having optimistic
beliefs). However, because such e¤ects disappear when ± ! 1 —t h a ti s ,w h e n± ! 1 every PPS
for sophisticates involves completing the project — we feel such e¤ects are unimportant.
Having non-optimistic beliefs can also make it more likely that partial naifs never start the
project for worthwhileness reasons. But for partial naifs, relaxing the optimistic-beliefs restriction
can also change conclusions about procrastination on stage 1. Consider …rst the behavior of
partial naifs given stationary beliefs that di¤er only in m0. With stationary beliefs, we can analyze
24 Permitting non-optimistic beliefs requires a modi…ed de…nition of stage 1 being ¯-worthwhile:





¸ 0 where m0 =m i n fx 2
f1;2;:::gjb s(t;t+x)=1 g. Given this de…nition, we can show that sophisticates either complete the
project or never start, and they never start if and only if either (i) stage 2 is not ¯-worthwhile or (ii)
stage 1 is not ¯-worthwhile in all periods. Because di¤erent beliefs can alter the latter conclusion,
for …xed parameters some PPS’s might involve completing the project while other PPS’s involve
never starting the project.
28procrastination merely by rede…ning the tolerance for delay of stage 1 to depend on m0.I no t h e r
words, de…ning
d(¯;1;m 0) ´ max
n











the person procrastinates stage 1 if and only if d(¯;1;m 0) >d (^ ¯;1;m 0). The more pessimistic are
beliefs, the more the person is willing to tolerate delay — that is, d(¯;1;m 0) and d(^ ¯;1;m 0) are
both (weakly) increasing in m0. And due to the non-monotonicities discussed in Section 3 (see in
particular Footnote 15), having more pessimistic beliefs could make the person more or less likely
to procrastinate on stage 1. But since these e¤ects disappear when ± ! 1 —t h a ti s ,w h e n± ! 1,
d(¯;1;m 0) is independent of m0 —w ea g a i nb e l i e v es u c he ¤ e c t sa r eu n i m p o r t a n t .
Having non-optimistic beliefs can have more substantive e¤ects on partial naifs when we allow
non-stationary beliefs. To illustrate, suppose d(^ ¯;2) = 1 and d(¯;1) = 1 > 0=d(^ ¯;1).I f t h e
person has optimistic beliefs, she procrastinates stage 1. Suppose instead that the person has
non-stationary (and date-speci…c) beliefs b s that satisfy b s(¿;t)=1if and only if t 2f 2;4;6;:::g for
any ¿ 2f 1;2;:::g — that is, the person believes she would work on stage 2 only in periods 2, 4,
6,..., regardless of when she completes stage 1. One can show that, given d(¯;1) = 1, such beliefs
imply the person completes stage 1 in period 1, because she is unwilling to wait two periods until
period 3 to start working. This example re‡ects a more general result: Non-stationary beliefs can
create “deadlines” — dates on which there is a larger incentive to act driven by one’s beliefs about
future inaction — that help motivate partial naifs not to procrastinate stage 1. Such e¤ects do
not disappear as ± ! 1. It is worth noting that relaxing the optimistic-beliefs restriction does not
change our conclusions for behavior on stage 2. Hence, relaxing the optimistic-beliefs restriction
can make procrastination on stage 1 less likely while not changing the likelihood of procrastination
on stage 2, and hence might make the person more prone to incur costs without bene…ts.25
Finally, we note that our analysis in Section 4 of endogenous cost structure can also be sensitive
to the optimistic-beliefs restriction (for sophisticates and partial naifs). In particular, with endoge-
nous cost structure, in addition to the question of whether beliefs are stationary, there is also the
question of whether beliefs depend on the cost structure chosen. If beliefs are both stationary and
independent of the cost structure chosen, then our conclusions in Section 4 are mostly unchanged.
But otherwise belief-driven deadlines can motivate action, as above, and moreover belief-driven
incentives can in‡uence the choice of cost structure.
25 This conclusion further reinforces our point in Footnote 16 that partial naifs can su¤er worse
outcomes than naifs on long-term projects.
29Appendix B: Proofs
Recall that we assume for simplicity that when a person is indi¤erent between a =0and a =1 ,
she chooses a =1(see Footnote 9). Also, we use the abbreviation PPS for perception-perfect
strategy.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .(1) The complete argument is long but straightforward, so we omit the
details. In short, given ^ ¯ =1 , one can show that if stage 1 is ^ ¯-worthwhile (which for ^ ¯ =1implies
stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile), then any ^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s must have b s(ht;t)=1for all t and ht.I f
stage 1 is not ^ ¯-worthwhile but stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile, then any ^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s must have
b s(;;t)=0for all t and b s(ht;t)=1for all t and ht 6= ;. Finally, if stages 1 and 2 both are not
^ ¯-worthwhile, then any ^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s must have b s(ht;t)=0for all t and ht. In each case, a
unique b s satis…es these conditions. Given there is a unique set of ^ ¯-consistent beliefs, there exists
a unique PPS.
(2) We fully characterize the set of PPS’s with optimistic beliefs.
Consider behavior on stage 2. Suppose d(^ ¯;2) = 1,o r¡k +
^ ¯±v










for all x 2f 1;2;:::g, argmaxa2f0;1g V t(a;ht;s 0; ^ ¯)=0for
any s0 and ht 6= ;.H e n c e ,a n y^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s must have b s(ht;t)=0for all t and ht 6= ;.
Also, because d(^ ¯;2) = 1 implies d(¯;2) = 1, a similar logic yields that any PPS s must have
s(ht;t)=0for all t and ht 6= ;.
Suppose d(^ ¯;2) = z2 < 1. For any ht 6= ;, argmaxa2f0;1g V t(a;ht;s 0; ^ ¯)=0if and only if
minfx 2f 1;2;:::gjs0(ht;t+ x)=1 g·z2. It follows that any ^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s must satisfy
the following condition: For every ht 6= ; there exists y 2f 1;:::;z2 +1g such that b s(ht;h t +x)=1
if and only if x 2f y;y+(z2+1);y+2(z2+1);:::g. The restriction to optimistic beliefs then chooses
y =1 . Hence, if d(^ ¯;2) = z2 < 1,t h e na n yo p t i m i s t i c^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s must have, for every
ht 6= ;, b s(ht;h t + x)=1if and only if x 2f 1;1+( z2 +1 ) ;1+2 ( z2 +1 ) ;:::g.






Because d(¯;2) >d (^ ¯;2) implies V t(1;ht;b s;¯)=¡k +
¯±v





, it follows that
d(¯;2) >d (^ ¯;2) implies s(ht;t)=0for all t and ht 6= ;. In contrast, d(¯;2) = d(^ ¯;2) = z2 implies










if d = z2 +1.I t
follows that d(¯;2) = d(^ ¯;2) = z2 implies any PPS s must have, for every ht 6= ;, s(ht;h t +x)=1
if and only if x 2f 1;1+( z2 +1 ) ;1+2 ( z2 +1 ) ;:::g.
Now consider behavior on stage 1. If d(^ ¯;2) = 1 and therefore any ^ ¯-consistent beliefs have
b s(ht;t)=0for all t and ht 6= ;, then clearly any PPS s must have s(;;t)=0for all t. Suppose
30instead d(^ ¯;2) = z2 < 1,s ot h a ta n yo p t i m i s t i c^ ¯-consistent beliefs b s have b s(ht;h t +1 )=1for
every ht 6= ;. In this case, the logic for stage 1 is exactly analogous to that for stage 2 except that
there is no analogue to the optimistic-beliefs restriction. The conclusions are (we omit the details):
(i) If d(^ ¯;1) = 1 then any PPS s must have s(;;t)=0for all t; (ii) if d(¯;1) >d (^ ¯;1) then any
PPS s must have s(;;t)=0for all t;a n d( i i i )i fd(¯;1) = d(^ ¯;1) = z1 < 1 then for any PPS s
there exists y 2f 1;:::;z1+1g such that s(;;t)=1if and only if t 2f y;y+(z1+1);y+2(z1+1);:::g.
Combining behavior on stages 1 and 2, there are four possible cases. (1) If d(^ ¯;2) = 1,o r
if d(¯;2) >d (^ ¯;2) and either d(^ ¯;1) = 1 or d(¯;1) >d (^ ¯;1), then there is a unique PPS s,
which satis…es s(ht;t)=0for all t and ht.( 2 )I fd(¯;2) = d(^ ¯;2) = z2 and either d(^ ¯;1) = 1 or
d(¯;1) >d (^ ¯;1), then there is a unique PPS with optimistic beliefs s, which satis…es (i) s(;;t)=0
for all t and (ii) for every ht 6= ;, s(ht;h t+x)=1if and only if x 2f 1;1+(z2+1);1+2(z2+1);:::g.
(3) If d(¯;2) >d (^ ¯;2) and d(¯;1) = d(^ ¯;1) = z1, then there (may) exist multiple PPS’s with
optimistic beliefs, but any such strategy s satis…es (i) there exists y 2f 1;:::;z1 +1 g such that
s(;;t)=1if and only if t 2f y;y +( z1 +1 ) ;y+2 ( z1 +1 ) ;:::g and (ii) s(ht;t)=0for all t and
ht 6= ;.( 4 ) I f d(¯;2) = d(^ ¯;2) = z2 and d(¯;1) = d(^ ¯;1) = z1, then there (may) exist multiple
PPS’s with optimistic beliefs, but any such strategy s satis…es (i) there exists y 2f 1;:::;z1 +1 g
such that s(;;t)=1if and only if t 2f y;y +( z1 +1 ) ;y+2 ( z1 +1 ) ;:::g a n d( i i )f o re v e r yht 6= ;,
s(ht;h t + x)=1if and only if x 2f 1;1+( z2 +1 ) ;1+2 ( z2 +1 ) ;:::g.
Cases 1 and 2 both satisfy statement 2a in Lemma 1, case 3 satis…es statement 2b, case 4
satis…es statement 2c, and so the result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Note that the four cases in the proof of Lemma 1 part 2 in fact hold
for ^ ¯ =1as well, although ^ ¯ =1implies d(¯;n) 2f 0;1g and d(^ ¯;n) 2f 0;1g.
(1) The person completes stage 1 in cases 3 and 4, which hold if and only if d(^ ¯;2) < 1 (stage
2i s^ ¯-worthwhile) and d(¯;1) = d(^ ¯;1) < 1 (stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile and d(¯;1) = d(^ ¯;1)).
(2) The person completes stage 2 (conditional on completing stage 1) in cases 2 and 4, which
hold if and only if d(¯;2) = d(^ ¯;2) < 1 (stage 2 is ¯-worthwhile and d(¯;2) = d(^ ¯;2)).
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. An analogous argument holds for stage 2.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 .TCs and sophisticates both have ¯ = ^ ¯,s od(¯;1) = d(^ ¯;1) and
d(¯;2) = d(^ ¯;2), and moreover stage 2 being ^ ¯-worthwhile is equivalent to stage 2 being ¯-
worthwhile. Hence, TCs and sophisticates complete the project if and only if both stages are
¯-worthwhile, and otherwise they never start. For TCs, given ¯ = ^ ¯ =1 ,s t a g e1i s¯-worthwhile if
and only if ¡c¡±k+ ±
2v
1¡± ¸ 0, and moreover this implies stage 2 is ¯-worthwhile. For sophisticates,
given ¯ = ^ ¯<1, stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile if and only if ¡c ¡ ¯±k +
¯±
2v
1¡± ¸ 0,a n ds t a g e2i s
¯-worthwhile if and only if ¡k +
¯±v
1¡± ¸ 0. The result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .From Corollary 1, TCs never start if and only if ¡c¡±k+ ±
2v
1¡± = ¡C+





1¡± < 0. In the former case, because ¡c¡¯±k+
¯±2v
1¡± = ¡C+¯V +(1¡¯)±k > ¡C+¯V
(given k>0), ¡c ¡ ¯±k +
¯±2v
1¡± < 0 implies ¡C + ¯V < 0,o rC=V > ¯. In the latter case,
¡k +
¯±v
1¡± < 0 implies ¡±k +
¯±
2v
1¡± < 0;a n db e c a u s e¡±k +
¯±
2v
1¡± > ¡c ¡ ±k +
¯±
2v




1¡± < 0 implies ¡C + ¯V < 0,o rC=V > ¯. The result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .For each statement, we prove there exists ¹ ±<1 such that the state-




(1) Stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile if ¡c¡¯±k+
¯±
2v
1¡± ¸ 0,a n ds t a g e2i s¯-worthwhile (and, given ^ ¯ = ¯,
^ ¯-worthwhile) if ¡k +
¯±v














there exists ±0 < 1 such that for all ± 2 (±0;1) s t a g e s1a n d2a r eb o t h¯-worthwhile. Finally,
because ^ ¯ = ¯ implies d(^ ¯;1) = d(¯;1) and d(^ ¯;2) = d(¯;2), Proposition 1 implies that for all
± 2 (±0;1) the person completes both stages.
(2) De…ne ±0 as in the proof of part 1, and note that because ¡k +
¯±v
1¡± is increasing in ¯,s t a g e
2b e i n g¯-worthwhile implies stage 2 is also ^ ¯-worthwhile. Hence, for all ± 2 (±0;1), the person
completes stage n 2f 1;2g if and only if d(^ ¯;n)=d(¯;n).






1¡¯±. Suppose c ¸
¯v











1¡¯± for all ±<1, and therefore for all ±<1 the person does not complete stage
1. Suppose c<
¯v
















1¡¯± for all ± 2 (±00;1). Hence, de…ning ¹ ± ´ maxf±0;±00g < 1, naifs complete stage
1 for all ± 2
¡¹ ±;1
¢
. The argument for stage 2 is analogous.
(3) Suppose c<
¯v
1¡¯. Part 3 of Proposition 1 implies that, just as for naifs, the person completes





1¡¯±, and hence our argument in the proof of part 2 implies that there















for all ±<1. Hence, by Part 3 of Proposition 1, for all ±<1 the person does not complete stage 1.
Again, the argument for stage 2 is analogous.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .By Proposition 1, the person completes stage 1 if ¡c¡¯±k+
¯±2v
1¡± ¸ 0
(stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile), ¡k+
^ ¯±v





guarantees d(^ ¯;1) = d(¯;1)). The person does not complete stage 2 if ¡k+
¯±v
1¡± < 0 (stage 2 is not
¯-worthwhile) or k>
¯±v






implies ¡c ¡ ¯±k +
¯±
2v
1¡± ¸ 0,a n d¡k +
¯±v
1¡± < 0 only if k>
¯±v
1¡¯±=^ ¯. It follows that the person
completes stage 1 but never completes stage 2 if three conditions hold: (i) ¡k +
^ ¯±v






1¡¯±, and (iii) k>
¯±v
1¡¯±=^ ¯. Hence, we need to prove that for all ¯, ±, ^ ¯>¯ ,a n d
c,t h e r ee x i s t sk and v such that all three conditions are satis…ed.
Fix ¯, ±, ^ ¯>¯ ,a n dc, and de…ne f(v) ´
¯±v





all v>0 there exists x(v) > 0 such that for all k 2 (f(v);f(v)+x(v)) conditions (i) and (iii)
are both satis…ed. Note that condition (ii) can be rewritten as k ·¡
(1¡¯±)c
¯±(1¡±) + ±v
1¡±.B e c a u s e
¯±v
1¡¯±=^ ¯ < ±v
1¡±, there exists v0 > 0 such that for all v>v 0 there exists y(v) > 0 such that for
all k 2 (f(v);f(v)+y(v)) conditions (ii) and (iii) are both satis…ed. Hence, for any v>v 0 and
k 2 (f(v);f(v)+m i n fx(v);y(v)g), conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are all satis…ed.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Because every (c;k) 2 PA;¹ a has c+k = A, we can transform the problem
into choosing k 2 [A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a] to maximize g(k) ´¡ (A ¡ k) ¡ ¯±k +
¯±2v
1¡± such that stage 1 is ¯-
worthwhile and stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile. And since g(k) is increasing in k,w em e r e l yc h o o s et h e
largest k 2 [A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a] such that stage 1 is ¯- w o r t h w h i l ea n ds t a g e2i s^ ¯-worthwhile.
(1) When ^ ¯ =1 , stage 1 being ¯-worthwhile implies stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile, and therefore the
only constraint is stage 1 being ¯-worthwhile. Stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile when g(k) ¸ 0,a n ds i n c e
g(k) is increasing in k, there exists k0 such that g(k) ¸ 0 for all k ¸ k0.I fk0 > ¹ a, P0(PA;¹ a) is empty
and therefore p¤(PA;¹ a)=;.I fk0 · ¹ a, the largest k 2 [A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a] such that stage 1 is ¯-worthwhile
is ¹ a, and therefore p¤(PA;¹ a)=( A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a).
(2) De…ne k0 as in part 1. Stage 2 is ^ ¯-worthwhile for all k ·
^ ¯±v
1¡±.I fe i t h e rk0 > ¹ a or k0 >
^ ¯±v
1¡±,
then P0(PA;¹ a) is empty and therefore p¤(PA;¹ a)=;.O t h e r w i s e , t h e l a r g e s t k 2 [A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a] such






´ xo, and therefore
p¤(PA;¹ a)=( A ¡ xo;x o).
(3) Since lim±!1 k0 = ¡1 and lim±!1
^ ¯±v
1¡± = 1,t h e r ee x i s t s¹ ±<1 such that k0 · ¹ a ·
^ ¯±v
1¡± for
33all ± 2 (¹ ±;1). It follows that p¤(PA;¹ a)=( A ¡ ¹ a;¹ a) for all ± 2 (¹ ±;1).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .(1) Because (c;k) 2 Pendog(c;k),i f(c;k) has stage 1 ¯-worthwhile
and stage 2 ^ ¯-worthwhile, then P0(Pendog(c;k)) is non-empty and therefore p¤(Pendog(c;k)) exists.
Moreover, by de…nition, if p¤(Pendog(c;k)) exists, then it has stage 1 ¯-worthwhile and stage 2
^ ¯-worthwhile.
(2) If the person completes the project under exogenous cost structure (c;k),t h e n(c;k) has
stage 1 ¯-worthwhile and stage 2 ¯-worthwhile (by Proposition 1), and so p¤(Pendog(c;k)) exists
and has stage 1 ¯-worthwhile and stage 2 ¯-worthwhile. Suppose p¤(Pendog(c;k)) = (c0;k0).G i v e n
stage 2 ¯-worthwhile, and given optimistic beliefs, the person always believes that if she completes
stage 1 (incurs c0) now then she will complete stage 2 (incur k0) next period. That is, one option is
to complete (c0;k0) beginning now. Because ^ ¯ = ¯, the person has correct beliefs, and given stage
1i s¯-worthwhile, the person waits only if she will complete the project in the future. It follows
that she must (eventually) complete the project.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .(1) Follows from Proposition 3 part 1 and Proposition 5 part 2.
(2) Under exogenous cost structure (c;k), by Proposition 3 part 2, the person completes stage 1
if and only if c<
¯v
1¡¯, and the person completes the project if and only if maxfc;kg <
¯v
1¡¯. Under
endogenous cost structure, Lemma 2 implies p¤(Pendog(c;k)) = ((c+k)¡¹ a;¹ a). Applying the logic
from Proposition 3 part 2, the person completes stage 1 if and only if (c + k) ¡ ¹ a<
¯v
1¡¯,a n dt h e
person completes the project if and only if maxf(c+k)¡¹ a;¹ ag =¹ a<
¯v
1¡¯.B e c a u s e(c+k)¡¹ a · c
(given k · ¹ a), the person is more likely to complete stage 1 under Pendog(c;k) than under (c;k).
Because ¹ a ¸ maxfc;kg, the person is less likely to complete the project under Pendog(c;k) than
under (c;k).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .Note x0(y)=
¡h0(y)
h0(x(y)), which implies x0(x¤)=¡1 (since x(x¤)=x¤)
and sign x00 = sign ¡h00. Also, for ± close enough to 1, all relevant possibilities have stages 1




=( x(y¤);y¤) where y¤ is the y 2 [x(¹ a);¹ a] that
maximizes ~ g(y) ´¡ x(y) ¡ ¯±y +
¯±
2v
1¡± . Finally, note ~ g0(y)=¡x0(y) ¡ ¯± and ~ g00(y)=¡x00(y).
(1) h00 > 0 implies x00 < 0,w h i c hi m p l i e s~ g00 > 0. Hence, we have a corner solution, and given




=( x(¹ a);¹ a). Because this holds for
any ¯, including ¯ =1 , the person never even considers any project besides (x(¹ a);¹ a),a n ds ot h e
argument in the proof of Proposition 6 holds here.
(2) h00 < 0 implies x00 > 0, which implies ~ g00 < 0 and so we might have an interior solution.




=( x(y¤);y ¤) for
34some y¤ 2 (x¤;¹ a]. The optimal y¤ may depend on ¯, and so a person currently working on stage 1
may think she would complete a di¤erent project if she waits. Speci…cally, letting (x(y¤¤);y ¤¤) be
the project done by TCs (given ¯ =1 ), a person with ^ ¯ =1w h oi sw o r k i n go ns t a g e1c o m p a r e s
completing (x(y¤);y¤) beginning now to completing (x(y¤¤);y¤¤) beginning next period. If she does
complete stage 1, then her decision for stage 2 is identical to that in the basic model.
Posit y¤ ¸ maxfc;kg.W h e n ± ! 1, the person completes stage 2 under ~ Pendog(c;k) if and
only if y¤ <
¯v
1¡¯. Under exogenous cost structure (c;k), she completes the project if and only
if maxfc;kg <
¯v
1¡¯ (applying Proposition 3). It follows that she completes the project under
~ Pendog(c;k) only if she completes it under (c;k). Note that if y¤ ¸
¯v
1¡¯ > maxfc;kg,t h ep e r s o n
does not complete the project under ~ Pendog(c;k) but she does under (c;k),s ot h eif direction does
not hold.
Posit y¤ < maxfc;kg, and note that in this case, minfc;kg <x (y¤) <x ¤ <y ¤ < maxfc;kg.







1¡± . By revealed preference, ¡x(y¤) ¡ ¯±y¤ +
¯±
2v
1¡± ¸¡ x(y¤¤) ¡ ¯±y¤¤ +
¯±
2v
1¡± ,a n ds o
the person completes stage 1 if ¡x(y¤¤) ¡ ¯±y¤¤ +
¯±
2v









1¡¯± y¤¤.B e c a u s e lim±!1 y¤¤ = lim±!1 x(y¤¤)=x¤,i fx¤ <
¯v
1¡¯ then there exists
¹ ±<1 such that this last inequality holds for all ± 2 (¹ ±;1). If the person completes the project
under (c;k),t h e nmaxfc;kg <
¯v
1¡¯. Because this implies x¤ <
¯v
1¡¯, the person completes stage 1
under ~ Pendog(c;k). Because this also implies y¤ <
¯v
1¡¯, the person also completes stage 2 under
~ Pendog(c;k). It follows that she completes the project under ~ Pendog(c;k) if she completes it under
(c;k). Note that if y¤ <
¯v
1¡¯ · maxfc;kg, the person completes the project under ~ Pendog(c;k) but
does not under (c;k),a n ds ot h eonly if direction does not hold.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .(1) Consider the person’s decision when she has n unstarted projects
and m started but un…nished projects. Given ^ ¯ =1(and given everything is worthwhile when
± ! 1), the person believes that (i) if she starts a project now, she will next …nish the m+1started
projects, and then start and …nish the remaining n¡ 1 unstarted projects in succession; (ii) if she
…nishes a project now, she will next …nish the remaining m ¡ 1 started projects, and then start
and …nish the n unstarted projects in succession; (iii) if she waits now, she will next …nish the m
started projects, and then start and …nish the n unstarted projects in succession. Hence, given n
and m, her payo¤s from her three possible actions are:



















































35She prefers starting to waiting if and only if ¯±mPn
i=1 ±2iv ¸ (1 ¡ ¯±m+1)c + ¯±m+1(1 ¡ ±)k +
¯±m Pn¡1
i=1 ±2i(1¡±)(¡c ¡ ±k). Because as ± ! 1 the left-hand side goes to ¯nv and the right-hand
side goes to (1 ¡ ¯)c, the logic from Proposition 3 implies that when ± ! 1, the person prefers
starting to waiting if and only if c<
¯nv
1¡¯.D e … n i n gnPS ´ maxfn 2f 0;1;:::gjc ¸
¯nv
1¡¯g,i tf o l l o w s
that the person will start a new project only if n>n PS.
Similarly, she prefers …nishing to waiting if and only if ¯
Pm
i=1 ±iv + ¯±m¡2 Pn
i=1 ±2iv ¸ (1 ¡
¯±m)k + ¯±m¡2 Pn¡1
i=1 ±2i(1¡ ±)(¡c ¡ ±k). Because as ± ! 1 the left-hand side goes to ¯(m+ n)v
and the right-hand side goes to (1 ¡ ¯)k,w h e n± ! 1, the person prefers …nishing to waiting if
and only if k<
¯(m+n)v
1¡¯ . De…ning nPF ´ maxfn 2f 0;1;:::gjk ¸
¯nv
1¡¯g, it follows that the person
will …nish a started project only if m + n>n PS.
(2) The logic above implies that the person will (eventually) start another project if and only
if n>n PS, and therefore she starts n¤
S ´ maxf0;N¡ nPSg projects. Similarly, the person will
(eventually) …nish another project if and only if m>0 and m+n>n PS, and therefore she …nishes
n¤
F ´ minfmaxf0;N¡ nPSg;n ¤
Sg projects.
(3) The person prefers …nishing to starting if and only if ¯
Pm
i=1 ±iv ¸ (1¡¯±m)(k¡c).B e c a u s e
as ± ! 1 the left-hand side goes to ¯mv and the right-hand side goes to (1 ¡ ¯)(k ¡ c),w h e n
± ! 1, the person prefers …nishing to starting if and only if k ¡ c<
¯mv
1¡¯. De…ning nI ´ minfn 2
f1;:::;Ngjk ¡ c<
¯nv
1¡¯g, the person will …nish rather than start if and only if m>n I.
If c ¸ k,t h e nnI =1and nPS ¸ nPF. nI =1implies the person always prefers …nishing to
starting. Because nPS ¸ nPF implies n¤
F = n¤
S, it follows that she starts and …nishes n¤
S projects
in succession. If c<k , the person must start nI projects (or n¤
S if n¤
S <n I) ,a n dt h e na l t e r n a t e
between starting and …nishing (because m alternates between nI and nI ¡1) until she has started
n¤
S projects and …nished n¤
F projects (given part 1).
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .(1) This is a standard, stationary search model, and so for TCs the
optimal strategy involves the usual cuto¤ rule. We note for use below that given cuto¤ ¹ v¤,t h ee x
ante payo¤ for TCs is U¤ ´¡ c + ±
h






, and a necessary
condition for the optimality is U¤ = ¡k + ±¹ v¤
1¡±.
(2) Consider a naif whose highest draw from a prior period is vo, where we say vo =0if the
person has not completed stage 1 in any prior period. This person believes that she will behave
like a TC beginning next period. Hence, the person’s perceived payo¤s from completing stage 1
now, …nishing now, and waiting now, which we denote by P1, P2,a n dPW, respectively, are:
36P1(vo)=
(
¡(1 ¡ ¯)c + ¯U¤ if vo · ¹ v¤
¡c + ¯±
h
¡k + F(vo) ±vo
















if vo ¸ ¹ v¤.
[Note that ¡(1 ¡ ¯)c + ¯U¤ = ¡c + ¯±
h







If ¡(1 ¡ ¯)c + ¯U¤ <¯ ± U ¤ or U¤ <
(1¡¯)c
¯(1¡±),t h e nP1(0) <P W(0) and therefore naifs never do
anything. Suppose otherwise. Since dP W
dvo = dP 1
dvo =0for all vo < ¹ v¤ and dP W
dvo > dP 1
dvo for all vo > ¹ v¤,
there exists vA ¸ ¹ v¤ such that P1(vo) ¸ PW(vo) if and only if vo · vA.S i n c edP 2
dvo > dP W
dvo for all vo
and P2(0) < 0 <P W(0), there exists vB > 0 such that P2(vo) ¸ PW(vo) if and only if vo ¸ vB.
Since dP 2
dvo > dP 1
dvo for all vo and P2(0) < 0 <P 1(0),t h e r ee x i s t svC > 0 such that P2(vo) ¸ P1(vo)
if and only if vo ¸ vC.
Because dP 2
dvo > dP W
dvo ¸ dP 1
dvo for all vo, and because P1, P2,a n dPW are all continuous, we must
have either (1) vB <v C <v A,( 2 )vB = vC = vA,o r( 3 )vB >v C >v A. For cases (1) and (2),
behavior path (ii) holds for ¹ vn =¹ vnn = vC. For case (3), behavior path (ii) holds for ¹ vn = vA and
¹ vnn = vB.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 .Using the notation from the proof of Lemma 3, P2(¹ v¤)=¡k+
¯±¹ v¤
1¡± ,
and since U¤ = ¡k + ±¹ v¤
1¡±, P1(¹ v¤)=¡(1 ¡ ¯)c + ¯(¡k + ±¹ v¤
1¡±). It follows that P1(¹ v¤) ¸ P2(¹ v¤) if
and only if k ¡ c ¸ 0.
(1) If c = k,t h e nvC =¹ v¤. Naifs might never search, but if they do, then vA ¸ ¹ v¤, and therefore
we must be in case (1) or case (2). Hence, if naifs search, they behave exactly like TCs.
(2) If c>k ,t h e nvC < ¹ v¤. Naifs might never search, but if they do, then vA ¸ ¹ v¤, and therefore
we must be in case (1). Hence, if naifs search, they search with cuto¤ ¹ vn = vC < ¹ v¤ and …nish that
project.
(3) If c<k ,t h e nvC > ¹ v¤. Naifs might never search, but if they do, any of the three cases can
hold. We have ¹ vn =m i n fvA;v Cg¸¹ v¤ and ¹ vnn =m a x fvB;v Cg¸¹ vn.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 .Consider a naif who is considering whether to complete stage 1
(i.e., in period 1 or when she waited the previous period). Given ^ ¯ =1 , she compares completion
beginning now to completion beginning next period. Hence, she completes stage 1 if and only
if ¡c ¡ ¯±k +
¯±2v
1¡± ¸¡ ¯±c ¡ ¯±2k +
¯±3v




1¡¯±. Because this condition is
identical to that in the basic model, the logic from Proposition 3 implies that when ± ! 1 the
37person completes stage 1 if and only if c<
¯v
1¡¯.
Consider a naif who is deciding whether to complete stage 2 (i.e., when she completed stage
1 the previous period). Given ^ ¯ =1 , she compares …nishing now to completion of both stages












2. A logic analogous to that in Proposition 3 implies that when ± ! 1 the
person completes stage 2 if and only if k<
¯2v+¯c
1¡¯ .
Combining these two conclusions, the result follows.
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